K. MICHAEL MOORE, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff General Fidelity Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37). Defendants Northstar Holdings, Inc. ("Northstar Holdings"), Northstar Homes, Inc. ("Northstar Homes"), and Northstar Holdings at B & A, LLC ("Northstar B & A") (collectively the "Northstar Defendants") filed a Response (ECF No. 67). Defendant Katherine Foster ("Foster") also filed a Response (ECF No. 68). Plaintiff filed a Reply to Northstar Defendants (ECF No. 71) and a Reply to Defendant Foster (ECF No. 72).
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the Responses, the Replies, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order.
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine insurance coverage for personal injury and property damage allegedly resulting from the use of defective Chinese drywall. Plaintiff General Fidelity Insurance Co. ("General Fidelity") seeks a declaration that three commercial general liability policies it issued to the Northstar Defendants do not cover the personal injury or property damage alleged in the underlying lawsuit currently pending as part of a Multidistrict Litigation action in the Eastern District of Louisiana ("Underlying Action"). In the Underlying Action, Defendant Katherine L. Foster ("Foster") alleges that she suffered personal injury and property damage because the drywall used by Northstar Defendants to build her home was defective.
On April 3, 2009, Foster filed the Underlying Action in the Southern District of
On November 18, 2010, Foster filed a motion to amend her complaint in the Underlying Action. Mot. to Am. Compl. (ECF 68-3). Judge Fallon granted the motion on November 22, 2010. Order Granting Mot. to Am. Compl. (ECF 68-4). The facts in the Amended Complaint
General Fidelity issued three commercial general liability policies (the "Policies") to the Northstar Defendants. The first policy was issued to Northstar Holdings and Northstar B & A, with effective dates of coverage from October 22, 2006, to October 22, 2007. Policy Number BAG0002215-00 (ECF No. 29). The second policy was issued to Northstar Homes and Northstar B & A, with effective dates of coverage from October 22, 2007, to October 22, 2008. Policy Number BAG0004973-00 (ECF No. 30). The third policy was issued to Northstar Holdings and Northstar B & A, with effective dates of October 22, 2008, to October 22, 2009. Policy Number BAG0006227-00 (ECF No. 31).
The policies each have an "Insuring Agreement" that states: "[w]e will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of `bodily injury' or `property damage' to which this insurance applies." Policy Number BAG0002215-00, Form CG 00 01 12 04, at 21. It further states: "we will have no duty to defend the insured against any `suit' seeking damages for `bodily injury' or `property damage' to which this insurance does not apply." Id.
Each policy contains an identical provision called the "Florida Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement," which amends the general insuring agreement to create an exclusion. It provides as follows:
This insurance does not apply to:
Florida Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement ("Pollution Exclusion") (Form BOA-TPE-001-FL) (ECF No. 29), at 62.
On February 24, 2010, General Fidelity filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37).
The applicable standard for reviewing a summary judgment motion is stated in
Summary judgment may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir.1994). The moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id.
In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. However, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
This Court has diversity jurisdiction over the present action and therefore must apply Florida's choice of law rules to determine which state's law to apply. LaFarge Corp. v. Travelers Indem., 118 F.3d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir.1997). In the context of insurance contracts, Florida applies the lex loci contractus rule, unless a statute modifies or abrogates a choice-of-law rule. Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1331 (S.D.Fla.2006). Under this rule, the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed governs. Id. The policies were executed and delivered in Florida and the Parties agree that Florida law applies.
General Fidelity asserts that it does not have a duty to defend because the compounds and sulfide gases being released from the defective drywall qualify as "pollutants" and the damages and injury caused are excluded from coverage by the Pollution Exclusion. "The duty to defend depends solely on the facts and legal theories alleged in the pleadings and claims against the insured." Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (America) Corp., 52 F.3d 1575, 1580 (11th Cir.1995). Therefore, the Court must look at Foster's Amended Complaint in the Underlying Action as compared with the insurance policies to determine General Fidelity's duty to defend. Here, the crux of the dispute is
Defendant Foster argues that the naturally occurring elements strontium and sulfur are not pollutants. The policy defines pollutants as "any solid, liquid, gaseous, thermal, acoustic, electric, magnetic or electromagnetic irritant or contaminant." Pollution Exclusion. The policy does not define "irritant" or "contaminant." Id. When policies do not define a term, courts may look to alternate sources such as the dictionary to give the words their plain meaning. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Evans, 565 So.2d 741, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990). As succinctly stated in Defendant Foster's Response:
Foster Resp. in Opp. (ECF No. 68), at 10-11.
The Amended Complaint states that the presence of the excessive amounts of sulfur and strontium cause "damage and corrosion" including the "pitting and/or tarnishing" of metals. Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ¶ 54. In addition to the "malodorous smell" of "rotten eggs," the excessive elements have also caused "respiratory problems, sinus problems, eye problems, and nosebleeds." Id. ¶ 5. The presence of the excessive amounts of sulfur and strontium obviously irritates and contaminates. It causes "pitting and/or tarnishing." In other words, their presence corrupts the metals. Foster's description of bodily injuries, "respiratory problems, sinus problems, [and] eye problems," though vague, cannot escape the inference that the elements caused irritation or inflammation. Simply because the Amended Complaint did not use the specific words in the policy or relevant definitions does not change the analysis— using synonyms and broad terms will not circumvent the plain meaning of the language. See, e.g., Nova Cas. Co., 424 F.Supp.2d at 1333 ("plain language of the policy will be given the meaning it clearly expresses").
Furthermore, Foster errs in asserting that the excessive sulfur and strontium have "no particular effect commonly thought of as an irritant or contaminate." Foster Resp. in Opp., at 13. In Nova Casualty, the Court stated that "where the contract defines `pollutant' as an `irritant or contaminate,' the court should look to see if the disputed substance is alleged to have any particular effect commonly thought of as `irritations' or `contamination.'" 424 F.Supp.2d at 1334. Foster argues that gypsum does not, under normal circumstances, have particular effects. Foster ignores the fact that the disputed substance is not regular gypsum. The gypsum here is defective and its components
Foster also jumps to the conclusion that because Florida Statute § 403.703(6) deems gypsum "non-hazardous in nature," then its components—sulfur and strontium—must not be pollutants. This reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, the term "hazardous" does not appear in the policies' definition of "pollutant," nor does it appear in the dictionary definitions of "irritant" or "contaminant." "Hazardous" is not a necessary attribute of a "pollutant" as defined in the policies. Second, the gypsum used in the defective drywall clearly differs from the gypsum contemplated by the statute. Under normal circumstances, gypsum does not cause bodily injury or property damage. There is an obvious difference between commonly used gypsum and the defective gypsum at issue that has allegedly caused bodily injury and severe property damage.
Northstar Defendants claim that the purpose of such exclusions are solely for coverage of damage or injury caused by environmental or industrial pollution, and the Pollution Exclusion is therefore ambiguous. In support of this contention, they cite a case applying Massachusetts law, a case applying Texas law, and remarks from a public hearing. Northstar Resp. in Opp., (ECF No. 67) at 10-12. The Florida Supreme Court has specifically held that these kinds of exclusions when stated unambiguously do not only apply to environmental and industrial pollution. Deni, 711 So.2d at 1138 (finding similar pollution exclusion unambiguous in ammonia spill). There is nothing ambiguous about the exclusion here. Moreover, a Federal Court sitting in diversity should not act to create or expand states public policy and the Court will not do so here. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 783 (4th Cir.1995).
Thus, the injuries and damage sustained from the drywall are within the policies' Pollution Exclusion. General Fidelity has no duty to defend or indemnify. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted.
In light of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff General Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Northstars' Counterclaim for declaratory relief is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED.